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1. When the Schengen convention was originally devised, it was supposed to 
facilitate  
internal travel within the territory of member countries. When it was de facto 
incorporated in Amsterdam Treaty, its objective remained basically the same. Only 
with the coming eastern enlargement of the EU will the Convention acquire a quite 
different function: not to abolish internal frontiers but to impose strict rules on external 
land borders. As the new dividing line between members and non-members of the 
EU is likely to remain unchanged - the frontiers of Bulgaria and Rumania excepting - 
for the foreseeable future, the implementation of Schengen will per force acquire a 
very important and lasting place within the budding Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the EU. This fact seems to remain underestimated by the governments of 
both the old and the future members of the Union, and also by Moscow.  
 
2. Moreover, the political - in contrast to the economic - consequences of 
Schengen will  
be to a large extent shaped both by the influence of more distant past and by the 
anticipations, built-up within the last few years.  
 
3. Although the seven candidate countries of ECE (the Czech Republic, Estonia,  
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia) were between 1945 and 1989 all 
members of the Soviet block, their recent history is very different from that of Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine. They were all independent states after the I World War, and 
they all (Slovakia with certain hesitation) have since 1989 consistently pursued the 
path of democratic and market reforms, successfully adjusting their political systems 
to the norms prevailing in the countries of Western Europe. This has not been the 
case in the countries which entered the so-(misleadingly)-called “Community of 
Independent States”, formed by members of the late Soviet Union. Thus even without 
raising the issue of the more fundamental historical and structural differences 
between Russian and Western-European civilisations, we can say that the new 
eastern border of the EU will separate countries much more different than it has been 
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the case with earlier enlargements (with the sole exception of the – thinly populated - 
Finnish-Russian border). Moreover, the present political tendencies within Belorus 
and Russia (Ukraine remaining in this respect still uncertain) do not point to an 
increasing convergence of economic, social, and political systems of these countries 
with Western norms; witness the number of complaints against these countries filed 
with the (rather tolerant) Council of Europe. The contrast of economic level, of 
standards of living and generally standards of civilisation is also likely to remain 
striking: even if the GNP of the present candidate countries of ECE is below 50% of 
the EU average, the difference between them and their eastern neighbours is still 
greater than between, e.g., Poland and Germany. This is, for the EU, a novel 
situation: never before (again excepting the accession of Finland) has it physically 
approached the limits of what can be called “European political order”.  
 Thus when we hear about an envisaged “policy of generating good 
relationship”, we have to remember that this would be a relationship between very 
different entities, and therefore the standards of that relationship have to be carefully 
delineated.  
 
4. The present scheme of border crossing with Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (no 
visas  
required) is often presented in an aura of sentimental gloss. It is usually assumed 
that the lack of visa requirements has been an “achievement” of the times of change 
after 1989. It is not: it is a relic of the Soviet era, when visas between “allied” 
countries did not exist. What has been changed, and what has been an achievement, 
is the facility of obtaining passports. In fact, countries like Poland have never 
exercised their (theoretical) sovereign right to decide whom they wish to admit to their 
territories (while since 1991 the relation of numbers of the eastern border-crossing 
citizens of Poland and citizens of her neighbouring countries has been consistently 
about 1:19). That people are more free to travel is an unquestionably positive 
development; but lack of visa demands does not mean either that passports are the 
only documents required (vouchers, invitations, or cash to cover the expenditures 
during the planned visit have to be produced), or that the present conditions of border 
crossing are at least tolerable. They are, in fact, appalling; custom and other 
regulations change without advance notice, and border guards and customs officials 
are very inventive in their ways of wangling bribes. Present border crossing is in fact 
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not so much free, as subject to chaotic, arbitrary, and unpredictable rules. This is, of 
course, closely linked to the fact that petty smugglers (“ants”) form a majority of 
travellers. To a large and, by contemporary standards, unhealthy degree cross-
border trade turnover overlaps with the traffic of persons.  
 
5. The prospect of the eventual implementation of Schengen rules has been 
hitherto  
considered, by both Western and Polish analysts, mainly from the economic 
(influence on trade exchange) and social (influence on employment on both sides of 
the frontier) angles; and Polish-Ukrainian border has been the favoured subject of 
observation. But as the 1st July 2003 – the declared date of introducing visa 
requirements by Poland – approaches, it becomes clear that political aspects of the 
change will probably be even more important, and that the crucial frontier appears to 
be the one with Russia (Kaliningrad district).  
 
6. The issue of visas has been overplayed in the foreign policies of both Poland 
and her  
eastern neighbours. Given the lack of a clear vision of what Poland wants to achieve 
in her new relationship with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine; and given the limited 
range of instruments at the disposal of Polish foreign policy, promises of waiving 
altogether or postponing till the very last moment the obligation to obtain a visa was a 
handy substitute for any other, more substantial elements of programme. Visas have 
thus become both a symbol of the consequences (allegedly dire in this respect) of 
Poland’s entry into the European Union, and a surrogate for any concrete steps in 
fulfilling the promises of a better neighbourly co-operation. At the same time the 
anticipated economic and social influence of visas has been played up.  
 Several top Polish government representatives kept promising, as late as in 
2001, that “something would be done” to evade or soften Schengen rules; and 
technical preparations (especially in form of new consulates) for what was coming 
were for a long time delayed. In mid-2001 Polish minister of foreign affairs 
unexpectedly postponed the introduction of visa requirement for Russian citizens. 
Only in February 2002 a firm date for visas (1st July 2003) was announced; and thus 
only since then the policy of the full implementation of Schengen has become official.  
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 Polish equivocations had, of course, effects on the other side of the frontier. I 
think not only and necessarily in form of expectations that visas will never be 
introduced, but mainly in form of a belief that this is not a clear-cut case of rules and 
standards to be implemented. Even now some politicians keep suggesting that 
Schengen is something which can and will be tinkered with. This is, on the one hand, 
naive and in a way disloyal; on the other hand it deprives the Polish government of 
the possibility of using Schengen rules as an instrument of national policy. Most 
importantly, however, presenting the acceptance of Schengen acquis as something 
forced down our throats we play into the hands of those who wish to use visa 
requirements as not only a “proof” of Western ill will, of an expression of indifference 
or enmity towards Poland’s eastern neighbours – but also, if not mainly, as an excuse 
for refraining from political reform in Belarus and Ukraine. “They do not want us – 
why then should we follow their example [of democracy, rule of law, freedom of 
speech].”  
 
7. The slogan of a new “iron curtain” is often banged about. We have to observe 
that it is  
used with a paradoxical (and less than honest) twist. The original Iron Curtain was 
closed from the eastern, not from the western side. It did not concern visas, but 
passports: Poles (not to mention Ukrainians!) had to wait in line for visas to France or 
Germany, but the real difficulty was in obtaining official permission to travel abroad at 
all. When passport restrictions were lessened, hundreds of thousands started on their 
routes. Secondly, at the time – not so long ago – when visas were required for 
travellers within what is now the EU, nobody spoke about iron curtains. The US 
requires visas, and one has to pay just for an application, but no one suggests that 
the US has built up a  “curtain”. Nobody dares openly to question Europe’s need to 
control the influx of immigrants; and visas seem to be the most civilised, flexible, and 
predictable way of imposing such control. “New iron curtain” is an ugly political slogan 
which deflects our attention from what is essential: how to make frontier crossing 
easiest for those whom we wish to see most gladly and most often and those who 
should travel for the sake of making their own countries more democratic, free and 
eventually prosperous.  
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8. For the negative view on visas we have to substitute a positive one: of 
Schengen rules  
as a means of  introducing to East-Central and Eastern Europe urgently needed 
elements of order, legality and predictability applied to the movement of people. A 
person wanting to travel should know what is expected from a candidate for visa: the 
criteria must be clear and precise. And arriving at the border this person should know 
that if she or he has her passport and visa in order, she or he won’t have to produce 
any other documents, won’t be subject to humiliating questioning and arbitrary 
decisions. Consulates are not only offices for issuing visas; they are – or may easily 
be – centres for obtaining and spreading information, also about economic 
opportunities for both sides. Given the painfully wide civilisation gap between the EU 
and the three countries in question, consulates ought to serve also as exhibition 
windows and places of breaking fresh ground.  
Cross-border traffic is, as I have mentioned, heavily lop-sided. It is mainly 
Belorussians, Russians, and Ukrainians who want to travel to the EU, not the other 
way around. Therefore it should be in the interest of the authorities of these three 
countries to facilitate the activities of consular offices of Schengen countries.  
 
9. So far, however, the attitude of Russian and Ukrainian governments (the 
Belarus of  
Lukashenka feigns to ignore the West) has been different. Their main motif is: after 
enlargement, the situation will become intolerable. YOU have to do something about 
it! This is most clearly visible in the position Putin’s government has taken with regard 
to the prospect of Kalinigrad district becoming an enclave within the EU territory 
(bordered by Poland and Lithuania). Last year, in a memorandum addressed jointly 
to the European Commission and to the Lithuanian government, Moscow postulated 
special status for civilian transit from Russia to Kaliningrad, and suggested that 
making appropriate arrangements should be a pre-condition for Lithuania’s entry into 
the EU. During the recent (7th March) talks with the prime ministers of Poland and 
Lithuania, head of the Russian government Mikhail Kasyanov simply refused to 
accept that Poland’s and Lithuania’s entry into the EU has to result in both countries’ 
inclusion within the Schengen zone and thus in introducing visas for Russian citizens. 
Moscow demands from Lithuania and Poland that both countries not only refrain from 
requiring visas, but also that they provide special, privileged non-visa “corridors” for 
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Russian land and railroad traffic crossing Lithuanian and Polish territory. The 
European Commission had to remind the Russian government that such subjects can 
be a matter of consultations not between the candidate countries and Moscow, but 
only between the EU and Russia. At the moment of writing this report there seems to 
be a complete stalemate. Whether in maintaining that the Schengen rules are 
regulations which may be changed at will in negotiations with neighbouring countries 
the Russians only pretend to misinterpret the legal status of Schengen, or are playing 
for their own audience, or really do not understand what acquis communautaire is, 
may be not clear, but is in fine irrelevant.  
Therefore the administration of the shortest new borderline of the EU - 
between the district of Kaliningrad and Poland and Lithuania - is likely to become the 
most contentious. It should in fact force the EU to rethink and define its attitude 
towards Russia; it will also constitute the fullest so far test for Vladimir Putin’s 
declared “Western” option. Joining the US-led alliance to fight “international 
terrorism” was for Putin a fairly simple and easy decision, which had the additional 
advantage of giving him a free in dealing with the Chechen “terrorists”; becoming a 
member of this alliance does imply meeting any special criteria (like democracy or 
the rule of law). A friendly cross-border co-operation with the EU, however, is a much 
more demanding task.  
 
10. Thus Schengen may, somewhat unexpectedly, become a political fulcrum for 
the EU’s  
relations with its new eastern neighbours. The issue may be simply defined as: who 
will accept whose standards of coexistence and co-operation?  
 
11. Kaliningrad zone (15,100 km2, about 950.000 inhabitants) is easily and by far 
the most  
absurd territory of Europe. Its borders have no historical or ethnic or physical 
justification: there never existed in this area a country even approximately similar to 
its present scope. It does not make sense economically, either. Its only “justification” 
has been military. The district, with the ancient Königsberg as its capital, has come 
into being due to Stalin’s reparation demands, without either Germany or Lithuania or 
Poland being ever asked what they thought about it. And of course neither Poland, 
nor Lithuania, nor the EU can be held responsible for this absurdity. If Moscow wants 
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to keep Kaliningrad “oblast’” as a piece of the Russian Federal Republic, without 
consenting to give it even a modicum of autonomy, it should bear the full 
responsibility for consequences.  
 Kaliningrad is the most HIV-infested piece of Europe; other infectious 
diseases, as tuberculosis, are rampant as well. It is also an ecological disaster area 
(e.g., about 15 million tons of refuse are stored within the city of Kaliningrad itself). 
Living standards are lower than in Russia proper, and much (4-5 times) lower than in 
Lithuania and Poland; population growth is negative; life expectancy lower and crime 
rates higher than in Russia. While the number of Russian troops stationed there has 
been in the recent years reduced, is remains Europe’s most militarised territory (an 
“unsinkable aircraft carrier”): large patches of land are held off-limits to civilians, and 
in spite of long-lasting Polish efforts the waterways to the former sea-port Elbląg 
(Elbing) are still closed. Russian authorities deny that tactical nuclear missiles are 
positioned there, but the denial cannot be verified. Anyway, the zone presents a 
threat to its neighbours not mainly in military terms (although authors of catastrophic 
scenarios raise a spectre of the local commanders’ blackmail with nuclear attack), but 
in the terms of spreading diseases, ecological pollution, and crime. The district is an 
international centre of smuggling of alcohol, amber, cigarettes, narcotics and people. 
If the drastic difference of living conditions and civilisation standards continues, it 
must have a destabilising effect on Kaliningrad’s neighbours – unless the district 
becomes tightly isolated, which will make its internal conditions even worse.  
 The population of the district is almost exclusively Russian and consists of 
immigrants, and their descendants, from Russia proper, who have arrived there after 
1945; since 1992 there is a fresh influx of Russians coming from the Baltic Republics, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Local population has very limited, and since 1997 (when 
the regional law concerning the “Local free-trade zones in Kaliningrad district” was 
rescinded) in fact lessening influence on decisions concerning the internal policies of 
the Oblast’. Regional oligarchy, vying to take over the remnants of federal and district 
public property, is strong and highly criminalised. Political parties and groups are 
irrelevant; there are no signs of emergence of institutions of a civic society. All 
essential decisions are taken in Moscow. In spite of ritual declamations about 
Kaliningrad becoming a “shopping window” or a “Russian Hong Kong”, the central 
authorities are evidently afraid to reduce their administrative grip over the area; the 
idea of a Special Economic Zone bound with a free-trade agreement with the UE will 
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remain unrealisable as long as Russia is not a member of the WTO. The present 
governor of the oblast’, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, demands from the UE a “special 
status” without, however, acquiring a special status within the Russian Federal 
Republic: a contradiction in terms. On the one hand, Moscow dreads to produce a 
bad example for other territories within the “Federal” Republic”, on the other hand, it 
is obviously bent on exploiting the possibility to blackmail Kalinigrad’s neighbours 
with the dangerous absurdity of the area. Even now all investments to reduce the 
catastrophic pollution of the Baltic are financed by the Scandinavians.  
 Therefore the problem of Kaliningrad is in fact the problem of Russia’s both 
internal and foreign politics. Whatever are the consequences of implementation of 
Schengen rules with regard to this area will depend by and large on the attitude of 
Moscow. So far, the no-visa regulations have not in the least influenced the district in 
the way of making it more compatible with its future EU environment; rather the 
contrary, they have strengthened the pathological elements in social, economic, and 
political relations. However, as economic contacts with Poland, Germany, and the 
Scandinavian countries are developing, and since the local administration is and will 
obviously be interested in acquiring a larger room of manoeuvre in dealings with 
abroad, direct links with this administration are advisable and may in time produce 
some effects.  
 The problem of Kaliningrad will have be dealt with on two levels: of the EU’s 
external relations, and of the EU’s “Northern Dimension”, with which Kaliningrad has 
been engaged since its inception in 1997, mainly in the sphere of protection of 
natural environment. 
 
12. Belarus is the only neighbouring country where the government blatantly 
violates European human rights conventions, ignores international criticism and, 
sometimes brutally, suppresses opposition activities. Independent press is routinely 
harassed, political enemies of the president disappear, mass media are not only 
strictly controlled but also used to spread propaganda about, e.g., economic 
calamities which befall Poland, allegedly sold over to the Western powers. Until 
recently, the criticism of the independent Russian mass media played often a 
restraining role; now, with the Russian media under full governmental control, their 
attitude will reflect the official position of  Moscow. And Moscow has preserved its 
dominating influence over Belarus to a fuller degree than in any other former Soviet 
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republic. In fact, Belarus has never severed its close links with Russia, although in 
the heady atmosphere of the first months of post-Soviet independence the 
governments of President Shushkevich and Prime Minister Kebich tried to re-orient 
the politics of their country towards the West; unfortunately, these tentative attempts 
met with no response on the part of Poland and her western partners.  
 Territorially, Belarus is of a great strategic importance to Russia: as a wedge 
between the Baltic Republics, which are on their way to join both the EU and NATO, 
and Ukraine, which remains the most important area of political contention between 
Russia and the West; as the shortest route to Kaliningrad; as a thoroughfare to the 
West in general. This is why, whatever are the formal structures of the declared 
Union State of Belarus and Russia (which Russia is in no hurry to implement, given 
the cost of subsidising the ruined and unreformed Belarussian economy), Moscow is 
careful in keeping Minsk in the state of political, economic and above all military 
dependence. According to well-based estimates of the Warsaw Centre for Eastern 
Studies, the Belarussian army cannot function separately from the structures of the 
Russian army; in fact, both logistically and technologically the Belarussian army is 
fully dependent on Russian infrastructure and supplies. This same is true, even more 
fully, with regard to Belarussian security sector which can be seen as an active 
instrument of Russian political control over Belarus. Thus whatever will be the official 
Belarussian reactions to the changes on Belarussian borders, these reactions will 
conform to the wishes of Moscow.  
 Alaksandr Lukashenka want to implement his plans of an “even closer” union 
with Russia. He has abolished both the traditional Belarussian national anthem and 
the flag, and has banned the celebration of the “Day of National Independence” (24 
March, the anniversary of the declaration of 1918); it is indeed most unusual for a 
leader of a state with such short tradition of sovereignty to battle against his own 
compatriots’ support for national independence. Lukashenka seems to be interested 
in preserving the forms of Belarussian autonomous state only so far as they serve his 
own objectives. Although open and independently conducted public opinion polls are 
impossible, it seems that a majority of Belarussians wish to preserve close 
institutional links with Russia or even to forgo their autonomous structures.  
 Lukashenka could not have remained in power without Moscow’s support; at 
the same time, he has been ready (even if not eager) to fulfil Russian demands, 
primarily in the sphere of economy. However, Moscow plays the game of keeping its 
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distance (increased or reduced, as need arises) to Lukashenka’s autocratic capers. 
The embarrassment, expressed sometimes by the Russian authorities when 
confronted with blatant violation of civil liberties in Belarus, seems, however, to be 
only tactical. It allows Moscow to disassociate itself from the more glaring violations 
of the European Human Rights Conventions (which have led to Belarus’ suspension 
as member of the European Council), provides new possibilities of exerting pressure 
on Lukashenka, and above all puts Russia in the position of a responsible elder 
patron, an ideal role to be played with regard to the “Near Abroad”.  
 Due to the diplomatic isolation of Belarus and to the Russian tactics described 
above, representatives of the European Union’s habitually raise the issues connected 
with Belarus in talks with Russian authorities. The implementation of Schengen rules 
most probably won’t change this situation, especially as the foreign policies of 
Moscow and Minsk are closely co-ordinated. However, the Belarussian government 
has much less to loose in a possible confrontation with the EU. It may protest against 
the “imposition” of visas, but it may in fact welcome it as an opportunity to increase 
the isolation of its own citizens and as a “proof” of Polish and Lithuanian hostility. It 
may also retaliate by introducing high fees for visas for citizens of the EU, making 
Belarus even less accessible than it is now. Even now Minsk punishes politically 
unwelcome foreign visitors by expulsion.  
 This will impose on the authorities of the EU, Lithuania, and Poland a special 
moral and political obligation: to represent, in their dealings with Minsk, the interests 
of Belarussians themselves. We shall have to remember the situation before 1989, 
when the Western countries would, within the framework of Helsinki Agreement, 
demand from the Communist governments that they respect the civil rights of their 
own citizens. Analogously, by requesting  that the Belorossian authorities conform to 
the European principles of human rights and political liberties, the European Union 
will confront Minsk in the name of Belarussians, deprived of their own representation.  
 This is going to be a difficult and delicate task. Budding elements of the civic 
society, as opposition parties, free trade unions (formed with the assistance of AFL-
CIO), and other non-governmental organisations undoubtedly need and deserve 
international support, but are routinely presented (and often punished) by the 
government authorities (independent judiciary does not exist in Belarus) as foreign 
agents. The Belarussian masses are misinformed, passive, and easily manipulated. 
At the same time, however, reliable observers confirm the impression that although, 
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on the one hand, Belarussian civil rights activists represent a badly splintered 
minority, on the other hand they are strongly motivated and intellectually well 
prepared for their pioneering role. Paradoxically, although operating in much worse 
conditions, they have fewer illusions and misconceptions than their counterparts in 
Ukraine, where analogous elements of a civic society are difficult to locate.  
A delicate problem presents the existence of an important Polish minority in 
Western  
Belarus. Although they shun playing an overtly political role, Poles are among the 
best-informed and active citizens of the republic, and are almost unanimously 
opposed to the autocratic regime of Lukashenka. This is why the postulate of making 
visas (to Poland) easily available for members of the Polish minority in Belarus partly 
overlaps with the postulate of using EU visa policy as a means to strengthen 
democratic trends in this country. A similar role is played, even more discreetly, by 
Belarussian Roman Catholic Church (and also by some smaller Christian Protestant 
denominations). Roman Catholic Church, the best-organised and dynamic Christian 
denomination in Belarus, Russia, and also Ukraine, represents not just a religious 
faith, but also, in purely secular terms, a factor of  political change. Its believers are in 
direct contact with the Western standards of both spiritual and material civilisation, 
and tend to participate as conscious activists in the public affairs of their 
communities.  
 Belarus presents a cluster of paradoxes. On the one hand, no progress in the 
sphere of international co-operation, including, e.g., signing consular agreements, will 
be possible without the consent of Russia; in this matter the EU should have any 
illusions. On the other hand, Belarus’ status of an independent country gives the EU 
a certain leverage and a room of manoeuvre. Certainly, the European Commission 
should insist on Minsk signing a re-admission treaty, which is much easier to accept 
for Belarus than for Russia. But then it should propose cheap visas for students, 
special exchange programmes for young professionals, training programmes for 
farmers. A special effort is needed to get across to the population with information 
about consular services and conditions to obtain visas. The point is that for the same 
reasons why Belarus is important for Russia it will be also important for Poland, 
Lithuania, and thus for the whole EU. Belarus is not a big country; it is desperately 
poor and backwards – and thus offers a great challenge. The potential scope for 
development and for influencing the future of the Republic has been underestimated; 
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the institutional shake-up which will be caused by the implementation of Schengen 
may and ought to be used to change this situation.  
 
13.  The government of President Leonid Kuchma has repeatedly declared that 
Ukraine wants to “join Europe”, that it indeed intends to apply for membership of the 
European Union (Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs confirmed this goal while on his 
visit to Warsaw on March 14th). These declarations should not be taken out of their 
context. First, words have not been coupled with any actions, which would bring 
Ukraine politically closer to the norms and customs prevailing in the EU. Civic society 
in Ukraine does not exist. With the sole exception of the Communist party all political 
movements are evidently manipulated by the government and/or powerful economic 
oligarchies; most of them are rather short-term coalitions of professional politicos 
than political parties with programmes, leadership and registered members. In fact, 
within the last couple of years Ukraine has been moving away from Western political 
models. Corruption is rampant, and the legal system inefficient. Private ownership of 
agricultural property was made possible only by a presidential decree. Ukraine 
remains a presidential autocracy, certainly much more enlightened than Belarus, but 
with scarcely more legal guarantees of civil liberties and without real structures of 
parliamentary democracy. Second, both in official pronouncements and in popular 
attitudes the clear choice between entering the EU and preserving, and even 
strengthening Ukraine’s close relationship with Russia is rarely made. As recently an 
in late January President Kuchma explained that Ukraine intends to draw closer to 
Europe “together with Russia, and not by the Polish route, which is harmful to the 
national interests”. This statement seems to echo the formula of and inter-faction 
group in Ukrainian Parliament, formed in April 2001: “To Europe together with 
Russia”. Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs, on 14th March 2002 
expressed a similar view more obliquely: “We see our European and Euro-Atlantic 
option in the context of enhanced co-operation with Russia.”  
 The results of public opinion polls are equally ambiguous, if not outright 
confusing. The results of two such polls concerning Ukraine's "European option” were 
published in early March. According to the first (taken by the Razumkov Ukrainian 
Centre of Economic and Political Research), 57,6% of Ukrainians support European 
integration, and 31% consider it a priority in the foreign policy of Ukrainian 
government. At the same time 32% think that the priority should be given to closer 
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links with Russia. The pollsters, however, did not force the respondents to choose 
between the EU and Russia. (Joanna Konieczna has shown that other polls indicate 
that about 1/3 of all Ukrainians support simultaneously integration with the EU AND 
integration with the Union State of Belarus and Russia!) When compelled to choose, 
in an opinion poll taken by the Russian foundation “Obshchestvennoe Mnenye”, 58% 
of respondents answered that they imagine they would live better in the Union State 
of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus – and 33% that in the EU.  
 Nevertheless, it seems that the “European option” is slowly gaining more 
sympathy in Ukraine, thanks not so much to the governmental efforts as to the slowly 
growing awareness of the public; it is symptomatic that the inhabitants of Western 
Ukraine, who are most likely to have travelled at least to Poland, tend to be most 
supportive of the option. An unexpected boost of pro-European leanings has been 
recently (since Pope John Paul II visit to the Ukraine) coming from the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, which has been quite successfully vying for 
influence on believers with the Moscow Patriarchate, which is sternly opposed to any 
gestures of independence from Russian domination. The hierarchy of Kyiv 
Patriarchate, which enjoys the support of Ukrainian emigration in Canada and 
Western Europe, has been arguing for strengthening the “natural” links of Ukraine 
with Europe and thus with the structures of the EU. The coming implementation of 
Schengen convention should take these developments in account.  
 
12. Since 1991 consecutive Polish governments have dubbed Polish-Ukrainian 
relations a  
“strategic partnership”. While Ukrainian authorities often repeat the formula, they tend 
to apply it much more liberally, occasionally using it with regard to several other 
countries. (On most formal occasions they reserve the qualification only for Russia 
and the USA.)  More importantly, while Polish presidents, prime ministers and 
ministers of foreign affairs have used all their opportunities to support Ukrainians 
interests (also economic) and aspirations abroad, the Ukrainian authorities evince 
little reciprocity and shy from any signs of gratitude, evidently wary to admit that they 
“owe” Poland anything. This attitude tallies with the recent gestures concerning the 
past: President Kuchma announced preparations for the 350th anniversary of 
Pereyaslav treaty, which broke Eastern and Central Ukraine’s links with the multi-
ethnic Commonwealth of Poland and made it a Russian dependency; and Prime 
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Minister Kinakh envisaged a full rehabilitation of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurrectionist 
Army), which during and after the II World War committed massive atrocities on Jews 
and Poles.  
 This a-symmetrical attitude rests on three grounds. First, large parts of what is 
to-day Ukraine belonged for many centuries to Poland (Western Ukraine till 1939), 
which has created strong cultural and sentimental (but one-sided) bonds between 
Poles and present Ukrainian territories. Second, since the XVIIth century Ukraine has 
been a bone of contention between Poland and Russia; and today’s Ukraine is of 
course much more closely bound with the latter than with the former. Third, that an 
independent Ukraine is Poland’s best security guarantee vis-à-vis Russia has been a 
dogma in Polish political thought since Józef Piłsudski; and Zbigniew Brzeziński’s 
statement than an independent Ukraine is for Poland more important than 
membership of NATO is a phrase willingly repeated by any Ukrainian politician.  
 However, the net result of these factors is that Ukrainians have learned that 
they can count on virtually unconditional support of Poles on international scene; in 
other words, that they do not have to do anything to deserve a special treatment. In 
the same way they have interpreted expressions of American interest in their 
country’s independence. This consciousness of international self-importance has 
produced excessive expectations of spontaneous support from abroad, support 
which does not have to be coupled with any internal effort to reform the economy, the 
judiciary, and the political structures of the country 
 The choice is not so much between Europe and Russia (Ukraine can maintain 
best relations with Russia and at the same time move closer to the EC) as between 
European standards in political, social, and economic life – and no standards at all. 
True, Russia has been giving Ukraine a bad example by her autocratic forms of 
government, domination over neighbours, lack of respect for law and civil liberties, 
etc. But forcing Ukrainians to decide whether they prefer EITHER close links with 
Russia OR close links with the EC distorts the situation. For example, the demand 
that Ukraine delimits and demarcates her border with Russia amounts to a request 
that it fulfils the criteria of a legally well-defined independent country (how to sign a 
treaty, abolishing visas, with a country without demarcated borders?), and has 
nothing to do with pro- or anti-Russian attitudes. The population of Western Ukraine, 
which has the longest tradition of co-existence with Western civilisation, supports 
European integration by a much larger majority than the population of the other 
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regions; and sympathy for closer institutional links with Russia is here the lowest. 
However, these ostensibly pro-Western attitudes do not translate into more healthy 
forms of government, more respect for the law, and better understanding for 
European norms of inter-national and inter-governmental co-operation. Local self-
government authorities do not serve the interest of the local population, but of 
economic and political clans; they tend to use chauvinistic slogans to drum up 
support, and often flaunt agreements signed by Kyiv government (as in the cases of 
Juliusz Słowacki museum in Krzemieniec, or the Polish military cemetery in Lviv).  
  Poles and Ukrainians will be, after Poland’s accession to the EU, the two 
most populous nations of Europe, separated by a Schengen-administered frontier. 
This is yet another reason why the implementation of Schengen ought to be regarded 
as a potential use of administrative regulations for political purposes. The purpose I 
have here in mind is to make people aware that standards of cross-border co-
existence and co-operation has to be clear, strict, transparent, and predictable. Any 
loosening of these standards has to be earned by the given country’s adherence to 
the principles of law and order.  
 
14. The ratio of crossings at the Polish-Ukrainian border has been for the last 
decade  
oscillating between 94-97% Ukrainians to 6-3% of Poles. Thus it is obvious that new 
border regulations concern predominantly the Ukrainian side. This would to a certain 
extent explain the lack of preparations for issuing visas on part of Polish consular 
services. However, the main cause of the delay rested in the overblown role attached 
to the visa issue in Polish foreign policy (as explained above, point 6). The argument 
for waiving or postponement of visas for Ukrainians was supported also by 
exaggerated fears of a “collapse” of trade exchange between the two countries and 
by the concern for tens of thousands of little traders-smugglers, for whom petty (and 
based chiefly on evading customs and excise duties) trade was the main means of 
subsistence. This last argument is like arguing that a change of the present structure 
of farm-land ownership in Poland will result in a collapse of agricultural productivity, 
while in fact the reverse is true – although the reduction of the number of farms and 
people employed in agriculture will certainly cause much hardship. Introducing visas 
will undoubtedly change the proportions between petty trade carried in sacks or at 
best in car boots, and organised bigger-scale trade run by specialised firms. There is 
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no need to explain which kind of trade is more modern, more efficient, and more law-
abiding. And the sooner the trade exchange between Ukraine and its western 
neighbours is modernised, the stronger will be the impulses for general structural 
changes in its economy.  
 As to the Ukrainian side, the authorities have repeatedly demonstrated (most 
recently by introducing, without warning, the requirement of certificates for imported 
foodstuffs) that they do not much care for the interests of their own population. The 
spectre of an “iron curtain” was a handy instrument of propaganda: on the one hand, 
it helped to exert pressure on Poland (“if you are as friendly as you say, do not 
introduce visas”), on the other, it was used to demonstrate that “the West” (or 
“Europe”) does not care about Ukraine. However, since the Polish government has, 
last January, announced the date of recently of introducing visas, a new sense of 
urgency has appeared on both sides of the frontier.  
An expansion of consular capabilities adequate to new needs is still delayed, 
but at least there is openly admitted concern about their insufficiency (to compare: 
the consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany in Kyiv issues daily 1 500 visas, 
i.e.. 300 000 per year; the existing five Polish consulates in Ukraine will have to issue 
not less than a million, which requires multiplying their present capacity about ten 
times). The Ukrainian side as well has begun to show active interest. During his visit 
to Warsaw minister Zlenko expressed his hope that visas will be not difficult to obtain 
and not too expensive, and suggested that Ukraine may not in reaction impose a visa 
requirement on its side. This is a rather surprisingly reasonable attitude, based 
probably on a sensible expectation that waiving visa requirements for Poles (who, by 
the way, come to spend money in Ukraine), and perhaps for other citizens of the 
enlarged EU, will in time provide Ukraine with a good ground to ask in return for 
concessions.  
 
15. After 11th September 2001 the Ukrainian government has suddenly discovered 
that 
Ukraine lies to the East of Russia. The United States, eager to enlist Russia into the 
ranks of countries fighting international terrorism, moved quickly to offer Moscow a 
special relationship with NATO as well. Ukraine has been sidelined. The idea, 
supported by political analysts like Brzeziński, that the US relations with Kyiv will 
counterbalance and keep in check the neo-imperialists tendencies of Moscow, has 
  
 
17
been discreetly shelved. This fact will, of course, strengthen the hand of those 
Ukrainian politicians who advocate a closer alliance with Russia; anyway, Russian 
influence over Ukrainian economy and politics has been inexorably growing for the 
last two years, due to an extensive build-up of Russian investments in the key 
sectors of Ukrainian industry, especially in the privatised plants of heavy and 
chemical industry.  
 However, the evident slackening of American interest in Ukraine, and a re-
orientation of American foreign policy of the Bush administration, which is now 
centred on unilateral assuring of US internal security, potentially puts the EU in the 
position of a major political force in the area. The coming eastern extension adds 
both clarity and urgency to this new role of the Union. Of course, the EU may evade 
the challenge and miss the opportunity, either because of a deficit of political vision 
and leadership, or because the Union is still institutionally not prepared to take up the 
mission; after all, the CFSP is still in diapers... But if the challenges and chances of 
shaping the international environment of the Union, produced by its biggest 
enlargement so far, are ignored, it will happen to the Union’s detriment and at its own 
future peril. 
 
16. It is too early to say what will be the shape of a common European immigration 
policy 
with respect to the EC’s new eastern neighbours in the coming years. Much depends 
on the results of the present pre-election debate in Germany; it is well-known that, in 
spite of the present 10% unemployment, the Federal Republic will in the coming 
years need hundreds of thousands of new workers. They may be brought in, for 
instance, again from Turkey – or perhaps from south and east-European countries. 
When Polish economy emerges from the present period of stagnation, the tendency 
to import low-paid (if not necessarily low-skilled) workforce from Belarus and Ukraine 
will get a new and irresistible boost.  
 But economic and short-term factors aside, one may try to formulate certain 
general political postulates.  
The basic one is the principle: to keep borders as open as possible, but with 
clear objectives - economic, social, cultural, political - in mind. One must expect an 
interplay, which may take rough forms, between European economic needs and 
European ideals and long-term goals. Internal market forces will work in the direction 
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of making maximum use of easily available workforce; if these forces are given free 
reign, the result be to harden the present drastic civilisational and economic 
differences between the EU and its eastern neighbours. Thus a series of interlocking 
directives have to be developed, aiming at the following goals:  
1. To lessen the existing discrepancies, and this not only by the simple 
means of immigrant workers sending back part of their earning to their 
home countries (which tends to petrify both sides in provisional and often 
socially pathological situations); i.e., to avoid Belarus and Ukraine 
becoming permanent reservoirs of cheap and unskilled workforce.   
2. To target social groups, countries, and areas most promising from the point 
of view of the double goal: of balanced economic growth – and fostering 
democratic change, open society, civic institutions.  
3. To apply all-Union strategic planning. Committees of employers, 
sociologists, political scientists, economists, and the EC’s regional policy 
planners should determine the best tactics to satisfy European socio-
economic needs and at the same time to raise the living standards and 
improve the socio-political structures of the emigration countries.  
4. To avoid bleeding the emigration countries of the most skilled workers 
(which will  
be the result of implementing present German immigration rules).   
5. To encourage immigrants to come for a limited period of time, e.g., two or 
three  
years; this would mean also to restrict the possibilities of automatic 
extension of  
visas for members of families. 
 
17. I hope I have managed to demonstrate that the main political factor on the 
eastern side 
of the future (after expansion) border of the EU is and for the foreseeable future shall 
remain Russia. Moscow’s policies and behaviour overshadow the whole area of what 
Russian politicians habitually name “close abroad”. Directly or indirectly, Moscow’s 
handling of the case of Kaliningrad will influence Belarussian and Ukrainian attitudes 
to the European Union. 
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Since 1991 (the dissolution of the Soviet Union) and until now, Russia has 
been for the EU a rather distant object, with her role seen mainly in economic terms. 
With the movement of frontiers, the EU will face Russia directly. Some territories of 
the Russian “close abroad”, as the Baltic Republics, will now become countries of  
the EU.  
Moscow’s foreign policy within the last years has been marked with attempts – 
clear although not quite successful – of playing European countries against the US; 
that was the custom of the Soviet government, which was more efficient on this 
score; not only because the Soviet Union was much more powerful and threatening, 
but also because in the recent years the attitudes and policies of the EU members 
states have become less divergent and thus more difficult to manipulate. September 
2001 brought a new and unexpected development. It has been transpiring that US 
and EU concerns in foreign affairs often differ; also different seem to be the American 
and European standards of international co-operation. The US is more liberal in 
entering ad-hoc alliances; but by the same token it may more easily disengage itself  
from them.  
 The stability and predictability of President Putin’s Russia cannot be taken for 
granted. It is unlike the institutional stability of Western (and also Central European) 
democracies, which is based on the existence of civic societies, developed legal 
systems and ingrained political institutions. Present Russian stability rests on a fully 
personalised and radically centralised governmental system, in which democratic 
institutions (not even to mention the opposition, now successfully silenced thanks to a 
practical monopoly of TV media) do not play any role. Russia has recently 
experienced a period of rapid economic growth, but its pace is now slackening, and 
anyway the GNP level is still lower than 10 years ago. The scope and results of 
economic reforms have not been very impressive. Many internal and external 
observers believe that these reforms are running out of steam, with the easily used 
reserves of growth already exploited. If there is a new crisis, or even if the progress is 
so slow as to disappoint the population, political consequences may be staggering, 
since the responsibility for everything happening in the country is so much centred on 
one person, without any visible lieutenants or substitutes, without any organised 
supportive political structure.  
  A non-democratic Russia – and Russia is now  evolving in a direction opposite 
to democracy – as a powerful neighbour may, by the sole fact of its inherent lack of 
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stability, present a risk for the EU. But Russia is not only non-democratic, but also 
evinces clearly autocratic and imperialist leanings. Russian behaviour in Chechnya 
speaks for itself and it is unfortunately consistent with long-standing Russian 
traditions of treating national and ethnic dissent. As Bohdan Cywiński recently 
argued, a non-imperialist Russia remains a dream. For virtually all Russian political 
elites an independent Belarus and independent Ukraine are temporary aberrations.  
 European Common Foreign and Security Policy has to face this reality. The 
need to face it is the most important political consequence of spreading eastward the 
scope of the Schengen convention.  
 
18. Right now, in view of the impending changes at the new eastern border of the 
EU, the Schengen convention may be seen as an expression of a negative 
(=exclusive) European solidarity: in the name of internal prosperity and security the 
border must be made impenetrable to all persons we do not specifically wish to 
admit.  
To change Schengen from a negative (exclusive) to a positive (broadening, 
inclusive) solidarity should be a goal for the years immediately after the 
implementation of visa requirements. European immigration policy should be 
coupled with a European emanation policy: with a strategy of influencing and 
shaping the across-border environment. Our goal should be to emanate European 
values and principles; to propagate civil liberties and market economy, to encourage 
citizens’ influence on their authorities decisions. And the task should begin with the 
Union countries consular services – which ought to be if not integrated, then at least 
closely co-ordinated. The applicants for visas will come into contact, often for the first 
time, with European institutions: consulates, business firms in case of business visas, 
schools and universities in case of educational visas, with non-governmental 
organisations and political parties. Issuing visas should be seen and used to make 
the applicants aware of the standards of European public culture, and by the same 
token more conscious of their own degree of personal independence within their 
countries’ political and economic structures. In other and simpler words, Schengen 
should be used as an instrument of civilisational education, not rejecting and 
repelling, but enlightening and mobilising to own effort.  
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